Crisis Over Berlin

A Study Produced by the Historical Office, United States Department of State¹

Crisis over Berlin was produced by the Historical Office of the Department of State at the request of Martin J. Hillenbrand, a senior Foreign Service Officer and scholar of Germany. Hillenbrand requested the document in his capacity as Deputy Head of the Berlin Task Force (BTF), an interagency body charged with coordinating responses to the Berlin crisis. Hillenbrand's formal request of March 4, 1963 notes that the BTF found military histories of the crisis operationally helpful. Hillenbrand also hoped a State Department project focusing on the diplomatic aspects of the crisis would be, "useful in the future when the history of this particular foreign policy problem comes to be written." The Historical Office accepted the tasking on March 22, 1963. Dr. Arthur Kogan was relieved of his other duties to fulfill Hillenbrand's request. In conversation with Kogan, Hillenbrand emphasized the historical import of the project, requesting a "thorough" account of "some length." A Kogan received extensive access to highly classified Department of State documents for the purpose of creating the most comprehensive possible account. To address Hillenbrand's request for a comprehensive account, Kogan designed an eight-part study covering the period November 1958-December 1962. Kogan transmitted the draft of Part I to Hillenbrand on August 21, 1964. Hillenbrand extensively involved himself in the project, critiquing Part I in detail. Kogan noted, "Your comments and suggestions regarding Part I were most helpful and they have been fully taken into account in the drafting of the final version." While waiting for Hillenbrand's comments on Part I, Kogan finished drafts of Parts II, III, and IV. Hillenbrand, newly appointed Minister to Bonn, brought Kogan to Berlin in June 1965 so he could take an aerial tour of the city and speak to key actors in the Berlin crisis. Soon after the completion of this trip, Kogan was appointed Chief of the Research Guidance and Review Branch of the Historical Office. Kogan's new duties prevented him from working extensively on the Berlin study; he noted regretfully on January 24, 1967 that Hillenbrand's revisions to Parts II, III, IV, and V had not been included and that his work on the draft of Part VI was incomplete. Kogan sent Part VI to Hillenbrand on June 14, 1967. Writing that he would not be able to undertake the final two sections of the study, he expressed his belief that the present study, extending to September 1961, was sufficiently detailed to accomplish Hillenbrand's goals. The final copy of Part II was sent to Hillenbrand on August 11, 1969. The transmission letter for Part II stated that Parts III, IV, V, and VI, "will be given the final treatment before many months." In March and April of 1970, Hillenbrand, then serving as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), sent final versions of the Parts I through VI to senior officials in EUR, the Executive Secretariat to the Secretary of State, the United States Embassy in Bonn, and the NSC. Hillenbrand's enduring

fondness for the project led him to request declassification of the study, and in his memoir, Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat, Hillenbrand praised Kogan's valuable and detailed work.⁶

¹ Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian Records, Research Project 614, in six parts: Folder 614-A, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962: Part I: Renewed Soviet Threats Against Berlin and the Western Response, November 1958-April 1959, 126 pp., October 1966; Folder 614-B, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962: Part II: The Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, 118 pp., July 1969; Folder 614-C, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962: Part III: From the End of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Abortive Summit Meeting, August 1958-May 1960, 127 pp., October 1969; Folder 614-D, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962: Part IV: Developments During the Final Phase of the Eisenhower Administration, June 1960-January 1961, 96 pp., February 1970; Folder 614-E, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962: Part V: Developments in the Early Phase of the Kennedy Administration and the Meeting with Khrushchev at Vienna, January-June 1961, 56 pp., February 1970; Folder 614-F, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962: Part VI: Deepening Crisis Over Berlin: Communist Challenges and Western Responses, June-September 1961, 143 pp., April 1970 (includes Documentary Appendix). An additional part, Folder 614, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962: Introduction, 17 pp., October 1966, is missing from this file.

² Hillenbrand to Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Robert J. Manning, March 4, 1963, ibid., Folder 614-A.

³ Memorandum of Conversation between Hillenbrand, Kogan, and Edwin S. Costrell (P/HO), April 1, 1963, ibid., Folder 614-A.

⁴ Kogan to Hillenbrand, March 2, 1965, ibid., Folder 614-A

⁵ Historical Office Deputy Director Richardson Dougall to Hillenbrand, August 11, 1969, ibid., Folder 614-A

⁶ Hillenbrand, Martin J., *Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat*, Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998.